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Introduction
There appears to be a shift taking place in the traditional
union reluctance to get involved in entrepreneurial type business
decisions. Until recently most unions have resisted the idea of
co-decisionmaking or, even on a more minor scale, being brought
abreast of key decisions on an information basis. Except in wartime
when the principle of 'equality of sacrifice' moved unions into a
much more central role (participation in the War Labor Board at the
national level and in production committees at plant, company and
industry levels), the guiding principle of collective bargaining and
union-management relations has been 'management manages and the union
grieves.'
It is the premise of this paper that we are on the threshold of
an era of considerable experimentation with different forms of union
involvement in entrepreneurial decisions. In many ways the current
period (the early 1980s) is for union involvement in strategic
decision making what the early 1970s was for the quality of work
life. As we have developed elsewhere, we see this past decade and
the upcoming decade as a score of years that are stimulated
developments in the industrial relations system at levels above and
below the traditional middle level of collective bargaining.
The possible involvement in entrepreneurial decisions presents
for union leaders a whole host of issues and dilemmas; some of these
are similar to the dilemmas posed by quality of work life but others
are unique to the structure of decisionmaking found in coporate board
rooms.
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The Nature of Entrepreneurial Activity
Since the focus of this paper is on the involvement of unions
in entrepreneurial decisions, we need to define this term.
Basically, the concept relates to the range of operational decisions
that are needed to run the business - and affect employment over the
long run. In other words, the focus is on the strategy decisions
that affect the shape of the business, e.g., such events as
purchasing, expanding or selling a plant, embarking upon a new
generation of technology, starting a new product line, or divesting
from an old product line or business.
Given this definition, then, a series of subjects (all
interesting in their own right) fall outside of the purview of this
paper. For example, union influence over pension funds can have wide
reprecussions for the union movement (such as investing in union
firms thereby enhancing employment opportunities), but this is not an
operating matter for a given business (Sheinkman, et.al., 1980). By
the same token, the definition excludes the role of the union in
joining together with management counterparts to approach government
for the establishment of some type of industrial policy or, to cite
another example, becoming a party to a proceeding before a regulatory
body considering a new rate structure (as is often the case in the
telephone and power industries). These roles do not involve the
union in either approaching or confronting the company directly over
investment type decisions.
However, we should not draw the line too tightly since a union
that finds itself in partnership with management before some type of
government tribunal, may in the process find itself playing a more
influencial role with respect to the main areas of corporate
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strategy. Rather, for the moment we will hold these activities aside
and concentrate on the key areas of entrepreneurial activity and
examine the extent to which unions are or should be involved. A
related category of oint activities (one that is becoming
increasingly important) involves the 'industry booster' type role.
For example, the bricklayers and sheet metal workers unions are
banding together with their respective industry trade associations to
promote new projects and to pursue a program of 'let's get more
business for the benefit of both sides' (see the piece in this volume
by ). Assuming management finds such
programs congenial, there does not seem to be any reason for unions
not to be involved in programs of this sort except for the
opportunity costs of the time spent in such joint activities.
It is clear that these "big picture" roles for unions should
not be excluded from any consideration of what the labor movement can
or should be doing to foster member interests. Indeed, playing a
more decisive role in pension funds and helping corporations
vis-a-vis government agencies and competitors (anti-trust issues
aside) represent very important opportunities for unions. These
roles, however, do not impinge upon management discretion in
operating a particular business and do not involve the union
leadership in reconciling its traditional adversarial role with a new
role of involvement and collaboration. Thus, in this paper we will
be examining involvement in the matters of a particular firm that
raise serious dilemmas and contradictions for unions, given their
historical mission to serve as an independent representative of
worker interests.
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Reasons Why Unions Are Cautious About Involvement
A few factors can be noted that give unions pause with respect
to their involvement in entrepreneurial decisions. Some union
leaders believe that 'management should manage' because that is the
best way for operations to run more smoothly and efficiently. If
another institution is involved, then there is bound to be time
consuming deliberations and efficiency may be impaired. Evidence for
this point comes from research on German co-determination (Furlong,
1977).
More fundamental to the rationale for the union as an
institution is the point that involvement may weaken the union's main
function, namely, protecting worker interests. As representatives
learn about business decisions, they may lose sight of the impact and
consequences of these decisions for the rank and file.
A worker or union director may also get overwhelmed by the
detail and by the technical information that comes to board members.
Based on conversations with one observer of the German scene it is
clear that some worker directors are ineffective because they do not
have the background or the style for dealing with volumes of
financial material.
Moreover, it is possible for a labor leader to get caught up in
the glamorous process of the boardroom, to be thinking more about the
ideology of participation rather than about the bread and butter
issues, such as job security, that are of direct interest to the rank
and file. It can be very seductive to meet with top management in
very elegant surroundings.
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The modus operendi of corporate boards presents most workers
and union leaders with a foreign situation. The culture of decision
making by assent or consensus based on formal presentations, often by
staff and functional specialists is quite different from the town
meeting style of most unions where actions are taken after open
debate and often accompanied with considerable emotional energy.
Robert Stern (1983), who has studied the behavior of worker directors
in employee owned firms, has reported that the biggest surprise to
new comers is that boards do not take votes - often the meeting has
moved on to the next agenda item before the union representative
realizes that silence means support for the management position on
the pending item. Batstone (1983) found that only 10% of the items
presented to the British P.O. Board (composed of an equal number of
management and union directors) contained any information about
options or alternatives.
Another danger is that the participating labor leader may get
coopted or silenced into assent and become totally discredited
because of board decisions that appear to be unfair to the rank and
file. Again it is possible to cite an example from abroad. In the
instance of British Steel, where labor directors have been involved
for many years, the labor director from Corby could not say anything
to the rank and file about the impending shutdown of the steel mill
in that community. Management directors expected him not to reveal
the essence of top corporate deliberations. When it was announced
that the plant was going down, he found himself in a very difficult
position. The book by Brannen (1976) elaborates this theme by
presenting other examples of how worker-directors who knew about
impending closures were completely ineffective in advocating the
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interests of the rank and file. Unfortunately, their role was one
way: to report back to management the feelings of rank and file (in
effect giving management information so that management could push
forward) but not giving the local unions information so that they
could oppose the cuts. In one situation the worker-director's role
was even more embarrassing because the worker-director had implied to
local people that if they became more efficient, they would survive
-- which given the general market developments was not possible.
This last point relates to the reality that when a business
does not fare very well the union will share the blame for the bad
consequences: "The news may be bad and the messenger may be
killed." Moreover, one has to ask the question as to why some
corporations are now willing to allow labor leaders to come into the
boardroom when they resisted this step vehemently just a few years
ago. One explanation is that when things are going well business
wants to keep a free hand for fear that it would give unions a
bargaining advantage. When things are going bad, business likes to
have the company of union leadership as a way of educating the union
membership about the difficulties. One official in the UAW remarked
that as a result of briefing sessions with management he had come to
learn, "More than I want to know." In some field research that the
author did in Britain, it turned out that the labor leaders in the
shipyard industry who had the best picture about the future of that
industry (by being taken on some tours and being given some
information on a confidential basis) were the same leaders who did
not want to have anything to do with participation.
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Another variant of the same message comes out of the experience
of Studebaker - a company that was willing to share considerable
information and to involve UAW officials in some of the intracacies
of the business. When the company went down, there occurred a good
deal of hard feelings on all sides. These points are no different
than those made by Thomas Donahue (1976), who has said that the union
movement has to be careful when management comes bearing information
and invitations to participate in decisionmaking - "Usually
management wants to share trouble but not success."
Even where the business is successful and decisions, union
leaders have some role in shaping or at least monitoring decisions
that worked out well, it may not be clear to the rank and file that
their representatives should be credited with the good results. It
is difficult for workers in assessing something as complicated as
investment strategies, for example, to know what the "shadow"
performance would have been. In other words, just how much worse
would the overall situation have been if the union had not been
involved in the entrepreneurial decisions? Basically the assumption
of U.S. collective bargaining has been that a labor leader survives
by delivering concrete gains and opposing management decisions that
would have adverse consequences for the rank and file.
One problem with the increased participation that often
accompanies concession bargaining is that the employment gains that
are involved may only be evident over the long run; and consequently
it is difficult for the union to show concrete short run gains
compared to what would have happened, if the union had maintained its
adversary posture. For example, a labor leader does not get much
credit for protecting jobs when the rank and file do not know
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theirJobs were in jeopardy or do not know the extent to which their
jobs are going to be cut back. This potential bind that develops
from involvement at the top is the core dilemma for union leaders in
all aspects of collective bargaining; specifically, collaboration
with management can create severe internal political problems for
union leaders.
Moreover, the evidence from industrial relations systems that
have had the most experience with participation (especially
Scandanavia and Germany) is that workers do not place a high priority
on having their representatives involved in the global decisions of
the business. This conclusion is borne out in a comprehensive study
by the International Research Group (1981) and by Chamberlain (1981,
100) who makes the point as follows:
"Experience from Denmark indicates that democracy
at the shop floor level is a sort of system which is
considered more meaningful from the workers' point of
view than the representative democracy. At the same
time, the interest of trade union officials runs in
reverse direction: greater attention to more formal
systems of joint decisionmaking in the upper reaches
of the enterprise.
"This same reversal of interests is illustrated
in Germany. Workers are more concerned with
co-determination in the workplace, union officials
with co-determination on the supervisory board."
This view is supported by surveys of worker interests in
participation in the U.S. (Witte, 1980; and the Kochan, Katz and
Mower paper presented in this volume). These surveys consistently
show that workers assign considerably higher priorities to gaining a
direct say or issues affecting their specific jobs at the level of
the workplace than over broad corporate policies and how the business
is run.
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Reasons Favoring More Involvement
We can divide the reasons favoring greater involvement into
three broad categories: philosophical, increasing the size of the pie
(sometimes referred to as integrative bargaining), and neutralizing
the power strategies of management.
Philosophical Rationale. For some labor leaders having a role
in entrepreneurial decisions is seen as a means for achieving certain
broad social objectives. Walter Reuther, concerned about pricing and
profits of the automobile companies, often asked for a "look at the
books." Significantly, during the 1958 negotiations he went beyond
his usual request to see the books and proposed that the companies
reduce selling prices by $100 - and if subsequently the companies
had to restore prices to make a normal rate of return (after meeting
the union demands), then the parties would submit all these matters
to arbitration.
Close to this purpose is the "destatusizing" that comes when
workers get involved at close range with the executives of the
corporation. Herb Rebham, Vice Chairman of the Volkswagan Board and
the top union leader for the International Metal Workers
Confederation, makes the point as follows: "The fact that a guy who
used to work on the assembly line sits on the compensation committee
is interesting. We know all the perks." (Wall Street Journal, July
1, 1980)
A larger purpose [and one supported by the work of Bluestone
and Harrison (1982)] is the use of involvement to prevent
inappropriate disinvestment and the loss of economic vitality for a
community. Rank and file workers, especially if they are senior, may
not have the same stake in preserving the viability of the enterprise
as the national union leaders who are committed to a healthy union
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the latter may have the same interests as the community in keeping a
business functioning and fostering employment, union membership
strength, and economic activity for future generations.
The philosophical rationale has been well summarized by Brody
(1980,) who argues that the purpose of participation is to
"democratize the whole process of decisionmaking at the corporate
level so that the voice of workers will be heard in corporate
counsels."
Integrative solutions. Another stream of thinking about the
rationale for union involvement views the typical labor-management
relations as being stuck in a low trust syndrome. As a result, there
are many "missed opportunities." Due to low trust, management does
not share information about its intentions and may slowly walk away
from a facility - a type of gradual disinvestment process. On the
other side, the workers and the union, seeing the slow march to
extinction, act in a very defensive and adversarial manner. As a
result, both sides find themselves in a very unsatisfactory state of
affairs, unable to break out of the "prisoner's dilemma." Many
examples of these mutually destructive cycles have come to light as
part of the recent rush of plant shutdowns and the resulting
recriminations: Union: "Why didn't you tell us you were at the
brink?" - Management: "We didn't think you would listen."
Countering Management Power. By far the most important reasons
for union leaders getting involved at the strategic level is to blunt
adversive power strategies that are being followed by some
corporations. One of these might be called 'creeping
decertification,' wherein a company seeks to keep all of its new
plants unorganized and gradually shifts production out of its
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unionized plants into its newer plants. The purpose then of a union
getting involvement at the strategic level is to deal with such a
policy at its origin.
Another managerial power strategy is the whipsawing of plants
on the basis of the principle: "The low cost operation gets the
business (Buss, 1983). Unions have lived through an earlier era of
workers being pitted against one another within the plant and as a
result developed safeguards: the seniority system and a contract to
prevent management from playing workers off one another. Unions
currently find themselves forced to develop similar kinds of
safeguards to deal with competitive threats coming from a higher
level, namely, cross-plant comparisons. Historically, the union
response to management's strategy of divide and conquer has been to
take wage costs out of competition via the standard rate, the master
contract, or pattern bargaining. The ability to sustain these
policies has broken down in a number of industries and an alternative
route to the same end is through involvement at the highest levels of
the corporations.
Involvement in Entrepreneurial Matters at Different Levels
Following one of the main organizing themes of the Sloan
Project, we will consider involvement in entrepreneurial matters at
three levels. Let us first consider the lowest level, that of the
work group or the department. For the U.S. system of collective
bargaining, additional involvement in entrepreneurial decisions at
this level may not seem as critical as would be the case in other
systems since as a result of the detailed labor contract and the way
in which plant-labor relations are conducted, unions already have
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considerable influence, what some analysts have referred to as job
power or ob-control unionism as described in this volume in the
paper by Michael Piore. Nothwithstanding this already high degree of
involvement at the bottom tier of the system - as the
quality-of-work-life movement develops, some workers are assuming
increasingly managerial type of functions at the workplace; e.g.,
specifying how new technology should be introduced. In some advanced
forms of participation, workers are also involved in planning the
layout of new departments and in shaping the organization of work.
There are several implications for unions of the rapid growth
of quality of work life and other forms of plant level
participation. One of these is the need for unions to place any
effort to improve productivity at the plant level within the context
of corporate-wide employment prospects. It is important for a union
to ascertain whether the net effect of a program of involvement at
the work group level will be negative because the prospect is one of
static or shrinking employment or whether it will be possible for
more work and employment to be made available to the work group and
department involved.
Similarly, a union that actively participates in a cooperative
quality of work program at the workplace may find it necessary to
ensure that it will not be weakened on a corporate-wide basis because
of a "union free" policy. In other words, from the viewpoint of the
union the tradeoff must be, "We'll run the risk of modifying our
traditional stance at the local level if we receive some assurances
about our role on a corporate-wide basis." This is, in essence, the
linkage that Irving Bluestone and other officials of the UAW
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presented to General Motors in a showdown over the "southern
strategy" and the requirement that the concept of quality of work
life had to be coupled with GM's acceptance of the union at its new
plants.
At the middle level, greater involvement in entrepreneurial
type activities is currently arising out of the need to ensure that
the terms of concession agreements are being honored and
implemented. Examples of safeguards that have emerged out of
concession bargaining are discussed in the Cappelli and McKersie
paper and therefore only two examples are cited here. In some
agreements there is a commitment that the funds saved will be
reinvested in the plants involved. In order to ensure that this is
happening, a union needs to receive detailed information about
investments or to have a "look at the books." Enforcing the
principle of equality of sacrifice also requires the availability of
considerable information on white collar and managerial compensation
and employment policies.
Thus, again, there is a direct linkage of developments at the
level of collective bargaining for involvement at the highest level.
Specifically, workers will not be motivated to engage in concession
bargaining to save their jobs unless they can be assured that the
competitive gap has a reasonable chance of being closed as a result
of the new arrangements. This means the release of detailed
information about the position of the plant vis-a-vis competition and
suggests continuing involvement by the union in some type of process
suitable for monitoring the economic performance and future prospects
of the enterprise.
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Finally, we come to the highest level, the strategic level of
the firm, where union involvement in entrepreneurial issues takes on
its most controversial form. At this level we need to distinguish
the channels from the substance of the involvement. With respect to
the latter, there are two general subjects of interest to the union:
(1) union organizational security, that is, its representational
rights at existing and prospective plants, and; (2) the employment
prospects for its members. The driving rationale for involvement on
the part of a union at the strategic level relates to its need to
improve or protect its organizational status and/or the employability
of its members.
The channels for involvement fall into two categories: (1)
having a vote or directly influencing the decision (such as
representation on some type of board), and (2) receiving information
or being consulted about impending developments. The latter approach
includes a range of styles and techniques by which union leaders and
union members learn about relevant economic information.
Different Forms of Involvement
Before examining in detail one of the most talked-about ways
for unions to get involved, namely, membership on the board of
directors, we should make several distinctions. First, there is an
important difference between formal and informal procedures for
involvement. For example, some unions are given information on a
regular basis via briefing sessions, while others only learn about
developments in informal off the record discussions. Some union
leaders prefer the latter method, since it provides them with more
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political maneuvering room and if they so choose, to remain aloof,
and thereby avoid certain disadvantages that might come from having
been put on formal notice about unpopular developments.
The second distinction is whether involvement takes place on a
case by case basis or whether it occurs as a result of a more regular
procedure. The arrangements that have emerged from concession
bargaining to ensure that the terms of the contract are honored fall
into the first category of specific involvement to achieve the
essence of the agreement.
A trend appears to be emerging with the establishment of top
level communication sessions. These mechanisms are agreed to in the
collective bargaining contract but the sessions themselves are extra
contractual. In the case of Ford and the UAW, this is called the
Mutual Growth Forum, for Boeing and the IAM the concept is an annual
technology briefing and for ATT and the CWA the communication vehicle
is called the Common Interest Forum. This latter example has three
stated purposes:
1. Providing a framework for early communication and
discussion between the parties on business
developments of mutual interest and concern to
the parties and their constituencies;
2. Discussing and reviewing innovative approaches to
enhance the competitiveness of the Company and
improve employment security;
3. Improving understanding and relationships between
the parties and avoiding unnecessary disputes by
cooperatively addressing significant changes and
developments in the Union or Company environment.
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Presence at the Board Level
Thus far, Chrysler, and Pan American serve as the two prominent
companies where union presence on the board has been agreed to as a
quid pro quo for concessions. Significantly, the number of companies
with union and or worker designated directors is increasing steadily
in connection with employee stock ownership plans. Eastern Airlines,
Western Airlines and a number of trucking companies are going this
route. In order to talk about the subject with a larger base of
experience, however, we need to turn to European examples.
The presence of a union representative on a board seems to work
better when the approach is not overly adversarial. Thus, in Germany
where relations between management and the union are arms-length but
not antagonistic, the co-determination model has seemed to work
reasonably well. By contrast in the United Kingdom, especially in
the Post Office where an experiment was tried with worker
representatives both at the regional and national levels, the
experiment was judged a failure and discontinued after two years. In
fact, very few of the important decisions were made at the board
level and management proceeded to subvert the whole intent of the
experiment because they viewed the worker/union members as only
representing one interest group. Since union representatives had
been thrust into their midst, management never brought issues before
the board and decided most matters in management committees. In
turn, the unions took a very strong bargaining orientation which
further intensified the tension in the board room (Batstone, 1983).
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This case illustrates the point that it is not desirable to
force participation at the highest level. As illustrated by the
example from the Post Office, participation in a board room only
works when the union leader is respected and the other board members
see some advantage in having this person in the body and where the
board has accepted the fact that representation is a permanent rather
than temporary phenomena. For example, it is reported that Chrysler
Chairman Iacocca and UAW President Fraser have high respect for each
other and that Fraser's participation in the deliberation of the
Chyrsler Corporation has worked because of their personal rapport and
respect.
A second important point is that it appears preferable for the
union to have a presence rather than parity. The rationale for only
the minimal participation of one or two worker/union members is that
the trade union point of view can be presented and then the board
alled to reconcile it with the other perspectives that are relevant.
The problem with parity, as in the case of the British Post Office
experiment is that it presumes that only two interest groups are
involved. In such a situation, management maintains that it is
acting in behalf of all constituencies - with presumably the other
half of the board representing only the employees. This leads to a
very difficult and asymetric process. One purpose in having a union
representative participate in board deliberations is to improve the
quality of the decisions. It does not take more than one or two
union representatives on a board to achieve this result. Another way
to view the presence of the union is as a mechanism for referral of a
pending proposal back to the staff of the corporation for more work.
Under such a concept if the worker representatives
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are not ready to proceed, they do not have the opportunity to veto
but do have the opportunity to send it back for further
consideration,
Finally, there is the opportunity for innovative proposals to
surface and be considered because of the new perspectives involved.
It has been reported that Fraser was able to keep some plants of
Chrysler open because he saw an opportunity for some changes to be
made rather than having those plants be shut down. Similarly, worker
representatives in British Steel were able to help with the
transition arrangements and made valuable suggestions about how a
plant should be shut down and worker interests considered in an
integrative manner. A recent report on employee representation on
company boards in Sweden noted: "Employers appreciate the
contribution made by employee representatives. One such survey by
the SAF of their affiliates indicates that 20% said the work of the
board improved as a result of employee participation. Few had
negative comments." (Eiger, 1983).
Differing Views of Two Unions
Not all union leaders desire involvement at the strategic
level. A good illustration of how two unions, both in the key
manufacturing sector can differ with respect to the desirability of
involvement at the strategic level can be seen in the approaches
taken by the Steelworkers and the Autoworkers.
In the case of the Autoworkers there have been a number of
important developments illustrating substantially greater involvement
over the past several years. First, there is a member of the UAW on
the board of Chrysler. For the other companies, there are regular
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forums in which key UAW leaders are briefed about world-wide
employment developments. In the 1982 negotiations, the union
developed the important principle with General Motors of the "pass
through," namely, the linkage between a wage reduction and a price
reduction. While this concept did not end up in the final agreement,
it did illustrate the willingness of the union to become intimately
involved in the business matters of the corporation.
By contrast, the Steelworkers have not been involved on any
kind of comparable basis. Indeed, they passed by the opportunity to
receive detailed profit information because they felt the whole
business was "too complicated." When officials of the union are
asked about whether they might have played a role in reinvestment
decisions in some of the mills that have been slowly depreciated,
they answer as follows: "We knew what was going on but we saw no need
to get involved or to challenge the investment decisions made by
management." For a while after the 1979 contract was signed, the
union did ask for a report on maintenance expenses and major
investment decisions from each of its locals. However, from what can
be judged, little has come of this program. Rather, the emphasis of
the Steelworkers Union has been on the industry level and achieving
assistance from the government in the form of import protection and
relaxation of regulations. For example, as a result of the
tripartite committee that functioned during the Carter years, a major
change was made in the implementation date of the pollution control
program.
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Feasibility Considerations
If a union leader desires to have more involvement, it is much
more appropriate for this to take place at the level where key
entrepreneurial activities take place, namely, at the corporate
level.1 Thus, where collective bargaining takes place at either
the industry level (as in basic steel) or on a plant-by-plant basis
(as in the case of the majority of bargaining units in manufacturing
and services) supplemental channels of involvement will be needed to
achieve a strong union presence at the corporate level. This is
illustrated by our findings on quid pro quos in concession
bargaining. Only those unions that bargained on a company-wide basis
were able to get a quid pro quo from management, because they could
deal with the firm at the level at which strategic decisions are made
(Cappelli, 1982).
The second factor favoring involvement is the presence of a
small number of dominant employers in an industry. Typically in
oligopolistic industries investment decisions are large and discreet
and the stakes are high for the unions involved. By comparison, in
industries comprising many small employers, such as garments or
retail food, the union needs to play a role at the industry level in
I/Coping with multi-national corporations capable of allocating
investment resources and shifting production across national
boundaries presents special challenges to a union as illustrated in
the following quote: "The investment decisions for Spain and Austria
aren't made by Opel, they're made in Detroit. And since
co-determination ends at the border, we can't co-determine." (Wall
Street Journal, July 1, 1980). A more complete discussion of this
and other challenges to the labor movement caused by the
internationalization of the world economy is contained in the paper
in this volume by Lee Price.
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order to help stabilize the industry generally rather than worrying
about the fortunes of a particular enterprise or scruitinizing
investment decisions on a company-by-company basis.
The third point is that the union must have the company and/or
the industry reasonably well organized for there to be any prospect
of involvement in entrepreneurial matters. Few, if any, employers
will voluntarily open up their councils to union influence.
Consequently, the involvement only happens where the union has the
presence and the bargaining power to command attention.
Given the reluctance on the part of employers to allow unons to
play any kind of substantial role, unions face another dilemma over
the approach they take to achieving greater involvement. If a union
comes at the matter in an adversarial or power fashion, it is
unlikely that it will get anywhere. This is the reason that the
Lucas, UK shop stewards movement, that offered an elaborate list of
capital budgeting ideas and new products for operations slated to be
phased out, got nowhere. Probably the same thing will happen in the
United States to the ideas being proposed by a union-community
coalition at McDonnell-Douglas on the west coast. On the other hand,
if a union approaches the task of achieving greater involvement in a
cooperative fashion, it may walk away empty handed. This is where
"corporate campaigns" or other pressure tactics are likely to have a
role. Pressure may be needed to get access to strategic
decision-making, but once in place unions may need to be able to
demonstrate they can play both a representational and an integrating
role.
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There are no easy answers to this dilemma. This is why
experimentation is so important. It is also the reason why we need
to learn more about the role of legislation (such as in Germany and
Scandanavia) in fostering this process.
Labor Law Perspectives
Public policy has a strong bearing on the extent to which there
will be greater involvement by unions at the top of corporations.
There are several dimensions to this part of the discussion.
One issue is whether workers and their union representatives by
virtue of assuming managerial functions (whether at the plant level
via something like autonomous teams, or whether at the highest level
by participating fully in board of director deliberations) become,
for purposes in the National Labor Relations Act, a part of
management and thereby lose standing as an employee group or
representatives of a bonafide bargaining unit. This may be labeled
the "Yeshiva trap." At the point workers and their representatives
come to play a central role in governing the business, some would
argue that they lose the very ground on which the National Labor
Relations Act gives them bargaining rights.
Another issue involves the scope and dividing line of mandatory
and non-mandatory subjects for collective bargaining. Clearly,
entrepreneurial decisions fall within the non-mandatory realm of the
National Labor Relations Act. Thus a union cannot require that these
subjects be bargained over and cannot bring these matters to an
impasse. However, this may not be a major impediment given the point
that a bargaining or power approach to these strategic areas is not
functional in its own right. An employer that insists on opposing
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union participation on legal grounds would likely oppose the union
equally hard on other grounds, were this to become a mandatory
subject of bargaining.
However, there may be ways for public policy to foster more
involvement by unions in strategic matters short of making union
participation a mandatory subject of bargaining. Charles Morris
(1977) has proposed that the National Labor Relations Act be revised
so as to provide for the requirement of consultation on selected
strategic and entrepreneurial matters. This would be one step in the
direction of a type of legislative framework that exists in several
Scandanavian countries as well as on the Continent. Certainly, we
are not ready in this country to have legislation that would require
the presence of worker/union representatives in various management
councils, but we may be at a point where some type of consultation
and disclosure and communication of information to workers and union
representatives about important strategic matters would be
appropriate.
Conclusion
What does this all add up to? First, we appear to be entering
a period where there will be considerably more experimentation with
various forms of involvement, either the formal, periodic variety or
the informal briefings and consultation on a less regular basis.
The focal point for union involvement in strategic issues will
vary between the industry level and the corporate level depending on
two variables: the structure of the industry and the structure of
bargaining. A small number of oligopolistic employers implies the
corporate level is probably the key point for engaging strategic
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decision-making while in a highly competitive industry the focus for
union involvement is at the industry level. In so doing, the union
helps stabilize the industry and regulates competition over
industrial relations policies and practices across employers (the
garment example of avoiding cutthroat competition over wages) and the
union avoids the dilemma of promoting the competitive prospects of
one firm against another.
Where a union bargains on a single company basis it may already
have direct access to corporate strategic decisions via informal
contacts. However, where it bargains on a plant by plant basis or on
an industry wide or employer association basis, there may be a vacuum
created at the corporate level where key decisions are made and the
union lacks any presence, communication channels, and influence.
Moving to the other side of the equation, since employers will
resist involvement of unions, unions will need to exert bargaining
power to achieve recognition and influence over strategic decisions;
however, once access is gained unions must be able to demonstrate
they can play both a representational and an integrative role. To
this end, presence is better than parity on a board of directors.
Finally, American labor law poses a number of specific
constraints on the development of more union involvement. While a
wholesale change in the law to require union involvement or to make
this a mandatory subject of bargaining is probably neither advisable
nor feasible, perhaps providing consultation as well as information
and disclosure rights would be a step in the right direction.
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